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Most clinicians take for granted a simple, reductionist understanding of medical knowledge
that is at odds with how they actually practice medicine; routine medical decisions incor-
porate more complicated kinds of information than most standard accounts of medical
reasoning suggest. A better understanding of the structure and function of knowledge in
medicine can lead to practical improvements in clinical medicine. This understanding
requires some familiarity with epistemology, the study of knowledge and its structure, in
medicine. Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing is advanced as the basis for develop-
ing a more accurate understanding of medical knowledge. Tacit knowing, which explores
the taken-for-granted background knowledge that underlies all human knowing, is
explained in detail with a focus on its relevance for clinical medicine. The implications of
recognizing tacit knowing in medicine and medical decisions are discussed. These include
the ability to explain the importance of the clinical encounter in medical practice, mecha-
nisms for analysing patient and doctor as persons, and the need for humility given the
uncertainty that the tacit dimension injects into all medical decisions. This more robust
medical epistemology allows clinicians to better articulate the nature and importance of
patient-centred care, to avoid pitfalls inherent in reductionist approaches to medical knowl-
edge, and to think more clearly about the relationships between medicine and health care
at the individual and population levels.
During a typical day clinicians navigate dozens of medical
problems that do not involve any grave illness or dramatic thera-
peutic dilemma. Routine cases, however, involve complex reason-
ing that clinicians tend to take for granted. Consider the following
case:
A 38 year-old woman comes to your office complaining of
drooling and inability to move the right side of her face.
Symptoms began abruptly two days ago after a family
camping trip. She notes dry eyes and increased sensitivity to
sound but denies pain or other medical problems.
This description suggests Bell’s palsy, a fairly common problem in
neurology and general practice that most clinicians, regardless of
speciality, likely recall from medical school exams. Diagnosing
Bell’s palsy is neither unusual nor particularly difficult, so most
clinicians would not bother to ask themselves how they know that
a patient has Bell’s palsy. Understanding how clinicians know
what they know, however, is actually quite tricky. That simple
question conceals many assumptions and controversies about
knowledge and knowing that busy clinicians might dismiss as
theoretical problems best left for philosophers and academics
untroubled by the demands of everyday medical practice. Most
clinicians tend to take for granted that routine medical practice is
a ‘real world’, pragmatic, scientific undertaking whose conceptual
underpinnings may be interesting but are generally trivial, self-
evident, or irrelevant to decisions about patient care [1].
This perspective unfortunately leaves clinicians vulnerable to
the influences of what MacIntyre called ‘unrecognized theoretical
ghosts’ [2] that unknowingly shape their thoughts and actions. I
shall argue that clinicians can exorcise one of these ghosts by
investing a little time thinking about how and what they know, and
about how their knowledge functions in everyday medical prac-
tice. Doctors learn and practice in an environment that proclaims
the reductionist notion of medicine as applied science, despite a
large body of literature demonstrating that medical practice has
more in common with the social sciences than with the standard
account of hypothesis-driven, value-free science [1,3,4]. This
common misperception and the corollary that ‘real’ knowledge
comprises discrete information that can be completely described
through formal statements and explicit analysis creates a discon-
nect between how clinicians actually provide appropriate, patient-
centred care in everyday practice and how they tend to think and
write about medicine in the abstract.
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Repairing this disconnect requires a foray into epistemology,
‘the study of the nature, sources and limits of knowledge’ [5]. The
abstract, reductionist view of medicine presupposes beliefs about
knowledge that on close examination are inadequate to explain
how clinicians handle even the simple case of a patient with Bell’s
palsy. Most clinicians’ de facto understanding of medical episte-
mology cannot explain, for example, how understanding interac-
tions among patients and clinicians is fundamentally different
from solving complex mathematical or statistical problems. Clini-
cians whose understanding of medical knowledge accurately
reflects clinical reality will be less vulnerable to the siren songs of
reductionist epistemologies that lead many clinicians astray
[1,6–8]. Michael Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing provides a
starting point for constructing an epistemology of medical practice
that is rigorous and accessible to clinicians without extensive
philosophical training. A detailed analysis of how Polanyi’s
thought relates to medicine can explain and even predict many of
the tensions between everyday practice and medical theory. Along
the way, it also reinforces the traditional belief that face-to-face
clinical encounters between patient and clinician are theoretically
and substantively at the heart of medicine and suggests ways for
promoting medical decisions that, by acknowledging the role of
the person in medicine, are better tailored to individual patients’
needs.
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing
Michael Polanyi was a chemist and philosopher most well known
for developing the concept of tacit knowing [9]. Tacit knowing
refers to knowledge that functions at the periphery of atten-
tion and makes possible the conventionally recognized explicit
domains of human knowledge. The clinician faced with the Bell’s
palsy patient described above uses many different kinds of infor-
mation to understand her predicament. He concentrates directly
on certain aspects of her case and notices others only indirectly or
tacitly. The clinician listens closely to the story of her camping
trip but notices individual words only to the extent that they make
the story intelligible. During the neurological exam he sees her
eyes, skin and teeth, but only insofar as they provide information
about her facial nerve. He is unlikely to remember her eye colour
even after a careful eye exam. These indirectly appreciated back-
ground details are part of what Polanyi called the tacit dimension
of human knowledge. They form a largely taken-for-granted foun-
dation that makes the information on which the clinician focuses
directly, such as the patient’s story and the significance of her
neurological exam, possible. In other words, understanding the
patient’s story presupposes a tacit understanding of her spoken
words and gestures; the clinician attends from the details of the
patient’s clinical presentation to the conclusion that she likely has
Bell’s palsy.
Two features of tacit knowing are especially relevant to clinical
medicine. First, explicit knowledge cannot exist without a tacit
background. One cannot make sense of a neurological exam
without tacit awareness of the patient’s body parts and how they
are connected. A clinician who shifts his focus from the patient’s
neurological exam to her skin colour or clothing will tend to lose
track of his exam findings. The exam’s interpretation depends on
certain kinds of details remaining in the background and tends to
fall apart if those details become the centre of attention. The tacit
dimension is a by-product of the directional structure of human
interaction with the outside world (i.e. attending from background
details to overall significance). The same information – skin colour
– can function either tacitly or explicitly depending on how the
clinician directs his focus, but some underlying tacit component is
always present [9,10].
Second, just how tacit particulars give rise to explicit knowledge
cannot be fully captured in formal models or discrete steps; the
relationship is ultimately inarticulable. As Polanyi wrote, ‘we can
know more than we can tell’ [11] about the explicit conclusions
reached from tacit awareness of a case. The clinician may note that
the patient is upset and worried about her face, but he will be hard
pressed to explain exactly how her voice, facial expressions and
body language convey that impression. Even if he lists all the
individual features he notices that communicate distress, many
other signals that influence his judgments will remain unnoticed or
overlooked. The tacit dimension by its nature tends to be taken for
granted and so resists direct scrutiny or formal analysis. The tacit
dimension is so pervasive that in everyday practice experienced
clinicians often take for granted not only how recognition of
particular facial features allows the successful diagnosis of Bell’s
palsy, but even that such a process takes place at all.
The tacit dimension has its roots in the human body. People
walk, talk and eat with minimal appreciation for how their bodies
accomplish these tasks; they do not coordinate individual muscle
movements to chew gum or think about their vocal cords when
calling a friend. People necessarily take their bodies for granted as
tools for accomplishing some desired purpose; if talking required
deliberate musculoskeletal coordination, people would be continu-
ally distracted from the message they were trying to convey. The
depth of tacit awareness and coordination involved in routine
bodily movements is often appreciated only after it breaks down.
The patient with Bell’s palsy has her life disrupted because essen-
tial actions such as speaking and eating are no longer routine.
Eating demands constant attention to the possibility of drooling,
and her dry right eye is a continually irritating distraction. The
extent of the body’s taken-for-grantedness in human thought and
action is made clear in extreme cases of pain or sickness, during
which a patient’s deliberate daily effort may be largely consumed
with basic functions such as breathing, talking and staying awake.
The directional nature of tacit knowing also highlights the
central role of the body in communication. Direct, face-to-face
human interaction comprises a rich, highly nuanced exchange of
information; the wealth of verbal and non-verbal communication
[12] it includes is necessarily absent from written records, tele-
phone interactions and subsequent memories of an interaction. The
full range of tacit and explicit information about a patient’s par-
ticular problem or illness is accessible only from within the clini-
cal encounter. A video recording of an encounter conveys more
information than an audio recording, which in turn is more
detailed than a written medical record; the information omitted as
one moves away from the immediate clinical encounter is often
significant [13]. Clinical medicine involves interacting with and
understanding persons, and thus addresses a problem that is fun-
damentally different from and conceptually more complex than the
kind of reasoning involved in problems such as mathematical
calculation or measuring the masses of chemical isotopes [14].
The pervasiveness of tacit knowing and its taken-for-granted
relationship with explicit knowing explains why humans cannot
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use wholly explicit, completely formalizable knowledge. Human
knowledge can be conceptualized as a gradual extension from the
knower’s body to the object or idea of interest in the outside world.
This basic structure pertains to all human interactions in the world,
from eating breakfast to making sense of facial paralysis.
Tacit knowing in philosophy
Polanyi turned to philosophy from his career as a physical chemist
because he was interested in understanding the process of scien-
tific discovery and problem solving [11]. The dominant under-
standing of scientific discovery then (and now) was based on Karl
Popper’s hypothetico-deductive model, in which scientific knowl-
edge comprises information that is potentially falsifiable using
empirical data [15]. Polanyi’s philosophy began as a refutation of
this positivist tradition. He recognized that scientists’ ability to
identify and solve important problems involves finding a gap or
contradiction in an area of knowledge and then working to identify
a new, better conception of reality that resolves or explains that
gap. Polanyi demonstrated that humans’ ability to follow tacit,
unspecifiable clues to successful novel solutions accounts for their
ability to solve problems and make discoveries [16]. Humans’
ability to take the tacit dimension into account fundamentally
distinguishes human thinking from the mindless processing of data
that machines perform. Polanyi’s work has had an important
impact on the philosophy of science. Thomas Kuhn’s notions of
paradigm shifts and scientific progress in The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions were heavily influenced by Polanyi’s work on
problem solving [17]. Polanyi has also influenced other important
philosophers of science, such as Paul Feyerabend and Mary
Midgley.
Other philosophers have developed ideas that relate to the
concept of tacit knowing. The notion of taken-for-grantedness in
Alfred Schutz’s investigation of human experience [18] is similar
to and in some respects more robust than Polanyi’s tacit knowing.
Schutz, who was concerned with the social structure of knowl-
edge, recognized that in everyday life people explore and solve
problems only to the extent necessary for accomplishing the task at
hand. People’s motivations and existing stock of knowledge deter-
mine whether problems are sufficiently relevant to merit attention.
Many irrelevant or technical problems are taken for granted and
not critically evaluated or even noticed. A patient who works as a
fashion model will be extremely motivated to understand and
maximize her prognosis for recovery from Bell’s palsy, whereas a
patient who works in a factory may care little about her appearance
but be very anxious to know whether she has a progressive or
life-threatening condition. Taken-for-grantedness is even built into
the clinical encounter. Patients often assume the clinician’s com-
petence and desire to help unless something calls that assumption
into question. The experienced doctor may take for granted that the
patient’s Bell’s palsy is typical and so discount inconsistencies in
her physical exam as irrelevant to the (already solved) problem of
diagnosis [19].
Tacit knowing in psychology and the
social sciences
The concept of tacit knowing is also closely related to current
research on reasoning, skill and expertise in medicine. Recent
studies of medical skill and expertise have examined clinicians’
tendency to form diagnoses rapidly with little or no formal analy-
sis [20,21]. In general novice clinicians rely more heavily on
deliberate analytic reasoning, whereas expert clinicians are more
likely to use rapid approaches with minimal deliberation or reflec-
tion. These snap judgments seem to involve linking new problems
with prototypical past examples and become more prevalent
with increasing clinical experience [21]. This kind of immediate
experiential knowledge has been studied mostly as it relates to
visual pattern recognition [22,23], which, like Polanyi’s work,
draws heavily on insights from Gestalt psychology. These in-
sights from research on skill and expertise generally support
Polanyi’s argument that skills are acquired primarily tacitly,
through practice and apprenticeship, rather than by following
explicit rules [9,24].
Clinicians’ tendency to make judgments quickly has also
received attention in the research on decision making pioneered by
Kahneman and Tversky known as ‘heuristics and biases’ [25,26].
This research comprises a large body of evidence demonstrating
that people’s estimations of probability tend to differ from actual,
statistically calculated probabilities in predictable ways. The heu-
ristics and biases programme bears on the common criticism that
tacit knowing is an appeal to special knowledge or mystical insight
[27]. It is often conflated with that common nostrum ‘the art of
medicine’, which reinforces the mistaken impression that tacit
knowing is less rigorous or important than explicit knowing [1]. As
shown in the example of skin colour, whether information is tacit
or explicit has less to do with its content than it does with how it
functions in a particular situation. Tacit knowing is, like all knowl-
edge, neither inerrant nor completely unreliable. The heuristics
and biases programme can be interpreted as identifying and explic-
itly examining common tacit misperceptions in human statistical
reasoning. A clinician who learns that he tends to disregard re-
gression to the mean might then explicitly anticipate situations
where that tendency will lead him astray so he can avoid incorrect
conclusions.
The heuristics and biases programme has demonstrated that
humans’ tacit knowledge of statistics is unreliable, but cognitive
heuristics work quite well for many other kinds of complex judg-
ments [28], such as distinguishing men from women and recog-
nizing other people’s emotions [29]. Schutz and Luckmann point
out that people tend to take for granted knowledge they have no
reason to question or that is irrelevant to the problem at hand [18],
so it stands to reason that tacitly appreciated knowledge, while far
from perfect, will tend to be more accurate than chance in many
situations.
Implications of the tacit dimension for
clinical medicine
As described above, clinicians’ ability to incorporate tacit particu-
lars into decisions without employing a deliberate analytic
approach is an important, unavoidable source of both practical
expertise and systematic error in clinical medicine. Tacit knowing
is a part of even seemingly straightforward medical tasks, such as
diagnosing Bell’s palsy, where subtleties of interpersonal commu-
nication and physical examination are often relatively unimportant
for treatment decisions. Interpreting diagnostic tests, reviewing the
mechanism of Bell’s palsy and interpreting data on the efficacy of
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steroids in Bell’s palsy all presuppose domains of tacit knowing
that are different from but no less necessary than the tacit dimen-
sions of interpersonal communication and clinical experience [10].
Tacit knowing is not a tool or method clinicians can use, nor is it
an alternative to explicit medical knowledge. It is the indispens-
able foundation from which humans make sense of the world [30].
Interpreting and applying explicit information about Bell’s
palsy requires taking for granted a great deal about the meaning of
that information and the conditions under which it is relevant to a
particular patient. Formal diagnostic categories, clinical algo-
rithms, and rules of evidence can only pertain ‘in general’ or ‘all
else being equal’. That is, only when the conditions necessary for
those algorithms and rules to apply are met. Clinicians by defini-
tion tend not to notice these mostly tacit assumptions unless they
break down. Diagnosing Bell’s palsy takes for granted that stroke
and trauma have been excluded as diagnoses, and that spots on the
patient’s chin are acne rather than vesicles from an underlying
shingles outbreak. A clinical trial of Bell’s palsy treatments always
informs treatment decisions, except when it does not because of
methodological flaws or results that are not generalizable to certain
patients. Decisions about what constitute methodological flaws
also have a tacit component, as would methods for clarifying
judgments about decisions on those flaws, and so on ad infinitum
[10,31].
Reaching a reasonable decision about how to treat a patient’s
Bell’s palsy must also account for the fact that both parties in the
clinical encounter are persons. Calls for patient-centred medicine
[32] and focus on the clinical encounter [27] are not new, but most
such attempts have not questioned the standard view that knowl-
edge comprises only explicit information amenable to formal
analysis and so have tended to neglect categories of knowledge
with significant tacit components [33]. A clinician’s non-verbal
communication, for example, affects the patient’s emotions and
her decision to trust the clinician or not. Non-verbal communica-
tion also affects treatment plans. In a thin woman with Bell’s palsy
the clinician might fail to illicit a family history that suggests risk
for steroid-induced diabetes, or he might notice her hesitant speech
and discover she is worried about a possible brain tumour. These
personal aspects of communication tend to be less amenable to
measures and numbers than most physiologic parameters, but they
are no less important. The initial case vignette captures very little
of what actually goes on between the patient and clinician when
they discuss her problem. Other characteristics of personhood
are even more difficult to study. All persons have, for instance,
relationships with themselves, cultural backgrounds, secret lives,
emotions, perceived futures, habits, transcendent dimensions and
personal roles that may affect their illness but are nearly impos-
sible to evaluate or even detect with the techniques typically used
in medicine and medical research [34]. Developing and analys-
ing comprehensive taxonomies of personal characteristics and
how they relate to medicine therefore would require a significant
research enterprise involving disciplines far removed from clinical
medicine. For clinicians with more modest ambitions, real-time
observational research offers one important, underutilized means
of figuring out what actually goes on in the clinical encounter
because it can potentially identify tacit dimensions of inter-
personal communication and examine them explicitly [33].
The complex kinds of information and reasoning involved in the
clinical encounter require a frank acknowledgement of uncertainty
in medicine. The inescapable tacit component of clinical judgment
shows that medical practice is uncertain not only because clini-
cians and patients never have complete information, but also
because they rely on much of the knowledge they do have only
tacitly, in ways they cannot fully articulate. Uncertainty is further
compounded because the medical knowledge needed to recognize
Bell’s palsy comes from clinical experience, which allows for
faster, more accurate clinical judgment but also introduces addi-
tional possibilities for unrecognized errors. Responsible clinical
judgment even in this relatively straightforward encounter thus
requires not only caution but also humility about the limits of
medical knowledge and the certainty of any medical decision. The
need for caution is even more important when decisions are
reached without firsthand knowledge of the clinical encounter.
Accurate judgments about medical decisions are possible using
written records or administrative data, but people often fail to
appreciate that such records capture only a small portion of the
information available in the clinical encounter. Many current mea-
sures in the US health care system, for example, are simplistic
metrics that cannot distinguish appropriately individualized
patient care from care that is wasteful or even harmful [35].
At the start of this paper I suggested that failure to recognize
tacit knowing contributes to a gulf between the theory and practice
of clinical medicine. How can something so fundamental to all
aspects of clinical medicine remain almost completely ignored by
clinicians who rely on it every day to care for patients? The answer
lies in the structure of tacit knowing. People tend to ignore or take
for granted knowledge at the periphery of their attention. A clini-
cian attends carefully to the patient’s body, but he is almost totally
oblivious to his own body’s tacit role in his evaluation of the
patient. The body itself tends to be ignored in enterprises ranging
from riding a bicycle to philosophical reflection [36]. In fact suc-
cessfully practicing medicine (as opposed to thinking about how
one practices medicine) requires clinicians to concentrate on the
patient and take their own bodies for granted. The tacit dimension
is so easily ignored that clinicians sometimes have trouble even
recognizing it exists, let alone that it has any real or practical
importance. Montgomery describes the consequent persistence of
the reductionist ideal and belief in completely explicit medical
knowledge as an ‘epistemological scotoma’ that blinds practitio-
ners to the personal and tacit components of their own medical
practice [1].
Conclusions
The same insight that explains why clinicians typically overlook
the tacit dimension can predict common criticisms of the argument
that practicing clinicians should pay more careful attention to
medical epistemology. A busy, pragmatic clinician might argue
that if he already takes tacit knowing into account when he cor-
rectly diagnoses Bell’s palsy, investing additional time to under-
stand how he does so is unnecessary. Others might misinterpret
focus on the importance of tacit knowing in the clinical encounter
as an attempt to preclude any third party evaluations of medical
decisions or restrictions on clinical practice. Finally, many
researchers will point to existing studies on decision making that
demonstrate how people not only repeatedly make the same kinds
of cognitive errors but also have remarkable difficulty explicitly
recognizing or correcting them [37,38]. These researchers may
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recognize the function of tacit knowing, but consider it so unreli-
able that it should be avoided as much as possible.
The latter criticism is particularly relevant to the evidence from
the heuristics and biases programme demonstrating that people
have poorly developed statistical instincts. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that people’s numerical estimates are always
wrong or that they reason poorly in other domains important to
clinical medicine. Past experience with patterns of cranial nerve
dysfunction allows clinicians to diagnose Bell’s palsy without
leafing through medical textbooks; this ability depends on clini-
cians’ ability to take tacit knowing into account. Efforts to avoid
the tacit dimension by downplaying clinical expertise merely
change the kinds of information that clinicians take for granted
[10,14,31]. Single-mindedly avoiding tacit errors in Bayesian rea-
soning will not improve clinical judgment if it comes at the cost of
ignoring details of study design that make a clinical trial’s results
inapplicable to most patients. The typical statistical examples used
to illustrate cognitive biases often give the impression that clinical
problems have a single correct answer. Problems involving
persons are rarely so straightforward because of the range of
medical, social and personal factors that patients and clinicians
must navigate in the clinical encounter. More often clinicians and
patients choose from among several reasonable options after
excluding many unreasonable or harmful ones. Foregoing steroid
treatment for Bell’s palsy may be reasonable in a patient with mild
symptoms and poorly controlled diabetes; a magnetic resonance
imaging may be reasonable if the patient is unable to sleep or
function at work because of anxiety about brain tumours. Finally,
different clinicians will have different perspectives about how the
dangers of unrecognized bias stack up against the utility of clinical
experience. A primary care doctor who has seen several patients
recover from Bell’s palsy might feel his time-tested approach is
effective. A neurologist who sees patients after they fail to improve
on acyclovir may be frustrated that clinicians persist in using a
treatment for Bell’s palsy that has no proven efficacy. A statistician
may feel that neither general practitioners nor neurologists have
sufficient statistical power to allow meaningful conclusions from
their personal clinical experience with Bell’s palsy.
Naïve beliefs about medical knowledge can have deleterious
practical consequences. The mistaken belief that legitimate
medical knowledge comprises only explicitly quantifiable or reli-
able information is often accompanied by the corollary that infor-
mation that is mostly tacit is mostly unreliable and so a poor basis
for medical decisions. Clinicians who hear this advice often
enough may eventually draw the logical conclusion that the tacit
dimension should not only be ignored, but that information that is
difficult to quantify is likely biased and should be actively sup-
pressed. Clinicians who downplay their judgments about impor-
tant topics such as non-verbal communication, severity of facial
paralysis, trustworthiness, overall health, and patient sophistica-
tion because the basis of these judgments are difficult to describe
explicitly are throwing away much of the information necessary
for making individualized, person-centred decisions. These
assumptions about medical knowledge also affect aspects of medi-
cine outside the clinical encounter. They have contributed to the
recent epidemiologic turn in medicine whereby discussions of
information are often implicitly restricted to quantitative data and
treated separately from concepts such as patients’ values, prefer-
ences, and beliefs [39]. In health policy, focus on information’s
measurability or concreteness can obscure the distinction between
cost effectiveness and cost containment because discussions of
these very different goals tend to employ similar quantitative
methods [14]. More detailed reporting rules and methodological
requirements for published research cannot address the significant
tacit influence that industry funding exerts on research design and
interpretation of results.
Clinicians who can understand epistemology in medicine will
enjoy tangible benefits beyond the intellectual satisfaction of being
able to think about medical knowledge in a way that corresponds
more closely to the realities of medical practice. Appreciation for
the tacit dimension in human knowledge will help clinicians to
build a more accurate critical framework for evaluating what kinds
of information are important for particular clinical decisions. Rec-
ognizing the clinical encounter as an interaction between persons
provides better insight into the kinds of largely tacit information
that are important for promoting appropriately patient-centred
(and person-centred) care. Being able to talk and think explicitly
about the function of tacit knowing in clinical judgment will also
help clinicians to evaluate more clearly their own medical reason-
ing and guard against unclear thinking. Clinicians who justify
decisions with vague appeals to ‘the art of medicine’ or ‘gut
feelings’ likely misunderstand the advantages and pitfalls that reli-
ance on the tacit dimension entails. Similarly people who promote
one-size-fits all solutions to complex clinical problems are almost
certainly ignoring or suppressing the inescapable uncertainty that
attends all medical judgment. Recognizing tacit knowing in medi-
cine will make it more difficult for clinicians to convince them-
selves that knotty problems in medical practice have simple
solutions, but it will at least put them in a position to tackle these
problems in the light of day rather than in the shadow of mislead-
ing epistemological ghosts.
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